



# The challenge of Morphing for border control

Matteo Ferrara and Annalisa Franco

Biometric System Laboratory - University of Bologna (Italy)

*Workshop*

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
# What is morphing?

*“In computer graphics and animations, morphing is a special effect that transforms an image into another through a seamless transition”*



<https://noahmjacobs.com/computer-vision/face-morphing/>

# The morphing attack




# The morphing attack (2)


If a double-identity face image can be enrolled in the chip, two subjects can share the document



## Passport Issuance



## ABC Verification





# The morphing attack (3)

- The issued document is **perfectly regular**.
- The attack does not consist of altering the document content but in **deceiving the officer** during document issuing. For this reason, the morphed photo ID must be **very similar to the applicant**.
- The document released will thus **pass all the integrity checks** performed at the gates.
- It has been proved that:
  - 1 It is possible to create a **realistic morphed image**;
  - 2 The morphed image is able to **deceive the officer**;
  - 3 State-of-the-art face **recognition algorithms** can be easily **fooled**.

# Face recognition failures

Morphing (document image)




Criminal (at the gate)




# Face recognition failures (2)

Morphing (document image)




Criminal (at the gate)



# A real case

On October 2018, German activists used a **morphed** image of **Federica Mogherini** (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and a member of their group to get a **genuine German passport**.



The same group declared they are sending "magic" passports to **Libya**, to help immigrants entering Europe borders.

<http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/bild-1229418-1342122.html>

<https://pen.gg/campaign/mask-id-2/>

<https://mask.id/en/>







# Automatic morphing detection

Two scenarios:

- **Single image** – an algorithm should be able to classify a face image as morphed or not.



- **Differential image** – a second image (e.g., captured live at the gate) is available to help deciding if the suspected image is morphed or not.





# Automatic morphing detection (2)

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Different **solutions** have been proposed **based on**:

- **Micro-Texture analysis** using different features (e.g., LBP, SURF, etc.);
- **Topological analysis** of facial landmarks;
- **Deep learning** techniques;
- Reverse the morphing process (also called **Demorphing**).



# Automatic morphing detection (3)

Results on **SOTAMD** benchmarks:

## Single image Scenario (S-MAD)

Image format	Algorithm	EER	BPCER <sub>10</sub>	BPCER <sub>20</sub>	BPCER <sub>100</sub>
Digital	PRNU	44.8%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	SSE	<b>31.8%</b>	<b>65.0%</b>	<b>79.3%</b>	<b>91.7%</b>
	Deep-S-MAD	39.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	S-MBLBP	41.4%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
P&S	PRNU	48.0%	<b>85.9%</b>	<b>97.4%</b>	100.0%
	SSE	54.4%	94.9%	98.3%	<b>99.9%</b>
	Deep-S-MAD	<b>37.1%</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	S-MBLBP	43.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



# Automatic morphing detection (4)

## Differential image Scenario (D-MAD)

Image format	Algorithm	EER	BPCER <sub>10</sub>	BPCER <sub>20</sub>	BPCER <sub>100</sub>
Digital	BSIF	45.9%	78.3%	84.1%	93.8%
	DFR	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>	<b>3.9%</b>	<b>18.8%</b>
	MBLBP	33.5%	52.8%	59.9%	74.8%
	WL	37.1%	71.7%	83.3%	95.7%
	DR	52.0%	89.7%	94.7%	98.6%
	FaDe	14.2%	17.2%	22.8%	64.6%
P&S	BSIF	51.4%	95.7%	98.4%	99.6%
	DFR	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>	<b>4.1%</b>	<b>19.7%</b>
	MBLBP	29.3%	51.5%	62.4%	81.2%
	WL	36.2%	70.4%	82.8%	95.6%
	DR	50.1%	90.3%	95.4%	99.2%
	FaDe	17.2%	24.8%	32.4%	74.6%



# Automatic morphing detection (5)

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The **results** are **encouraging** but still far to be acceptable.

This is mainly due to the following **issues**:

- **Intra-subject variations** are stronger than those introduced by morphing;
- Different **morphing processes** introduce different perturbations;
- **Printed & scanned** images;
- **Lack of public databases**.



# Intra-subject vs morphing variations

Beard and Hair style



Makeup




Aging



Which is the morphed image?



# Printed & scanned images





# Conclusions

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- Morphing attack is today a real **security threat**.
- The best solution is **live enrolment**, but to be effective, should be **adopted by all countries**.
- **Detection techniques** are being studied (with **interesting** but **not satisfactory** results).
- There are **several open issues** to be solved (e.g., different morphing techniques, different conditions, P&S images).
- Common **benchmarks** and evaluations needed:
  - **NIST** Face recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) MORPH
  - **SOTAMD** (State Of The Art Morph Detection) EU project





ALMA MATER STUDIORUM  
UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA  
CAMPUS DI CESENA

## Matteo Ferrara and Annalisa Franco

Department of Computer Science and Engineering

University of Bologna

*matteo.ferrara@unibo.it*

*annalisa.franco@unibo.it*

Biometric System Laboratory

*biolab.csr.unibo.it*

